





IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 









On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of Florida, No. 4:21-cv-220 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE FIRST AMENDMENT LAW PROFESSORS IN 
SUPPORT OF APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE 
____________________________________________________________
G.S. Hans 
Counsel of Record 
       VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL 
       131 21st Ave. So. 
       Nashville, TN 37203 
       (615) 343-2213 
       gautam.hans@vanderbilt.edu 
       Counsel for Amici Curiae 
First Amendment Law Professors 
 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 1 of 25 
No. 21-12355, NetChoice LLC, et al. v. Attorney General, State of Florida, et al. 
 
C-1 of 1 
 
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS 
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons 
as described in 11th Cir. R. 26.1-2(a) have an interest in the outcome of this case, 
and were omitted from the Certificates of Interested Persons in briefs that were 
previously filed per 11th Cir. R. 26.1-2(b). 
1. Bambauer, Jane, Member of Amici Curiae 
2. Bhagwat, Ashutosh, Member of Amici Curiae 
3. Geronimo, Andrew, Member of Amici Curiae 
4. Goldman, Eric, Member of Amici Curiae 
5. Hans, G.S., Counsel for Amici Curiae  
s/G.S. Hans 
       Counsel for Amici Curiae 
First Amendment Law Professors 
 
November 15, 2021 
USCA11 Case: 21-12355     Date Filed: 11/15/2021     Page: 2 of 25 
 
 i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS ................................................... C-1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................................. 1 
SUMMARY .............................................................................................................. 1 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 3 
I. The First Amendment Protects Editorial Discretion, Which S.B. 7072 
Impermissibly Regulates ....................................................................................... 3 
A. Social Media Platforms Have First Amendment Protection for Content 
Policy Decisions, Which Requires a Strict Scrutiny Analysis .............................. 3 
B. S.B. 7072 Impermissibly Interferes with Editorial Discretion ........................ 5 
C. The District Court’s “Invisible to the Provider” Analysis Is Irrelevant .......... 9 
II. The State’s Construction of First Amendment Doctrine Ignores Key Doctrinal 
Tenets ...................................................................................................................... 11 
A. Florida Misconstrues Relevant Case Law on Editorial Discretion ............... 11 
B. FAIR and PruneYard are Inapposite ............................................................. 16 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 18 
LIST OF AMICI CURIAE ..................................................................................... 20 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,  
542 U.S. 656 (2004) .............................................................................................. 5 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston,  
515 U.S. 557 (1995) .............................................................................. 7, 8, 12, 14 
Memphis Pub. Co. v. Leech,  
539 F.Supp. 405 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) ..................................................................... 4 
Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo,  
418 U.S. 241 (1974) .............................................................................................. 4 
NetChoice v. Moody,  
No. 21-cv-220 -MAF, 2021 WL 2690876 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021) ........... 10, 13 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ca.,  
475 U.S. 1 (1986) .............................................................................................. 6, 8 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,  
447 U.S. 74 (1980) .............................................................................................. 16 
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,  
521 U.S. 844 (1997) ........................................................................................ 4, 18 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Inst. Rights,  
547 U.S. 47 (2006) ........................................................................................ 17, 18 
Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C.,  
512 U.S. 622 (1994) ...................................................................................... 13, 14 
Washington Post v. McManus,  
944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019) ................................................................................. 4 
Statutes 
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041 .......................................................................................... 2, 15\ 
Other Authorities 
Opening Brief of Appellant, NetChoice v. Moody, 21-12355 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 
2021) .................................................................................................................... 12 
Brief of Appellee, NetChoice v. Moody, 21-12355 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2021) ........... 5  
 
 




INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae First Amendment Law Professors have expertise in First 
Amendment doctrine and its intersection with new technologies, including social 
media companies. Amici have authored many articles and opinion pieces analyzing 
the application of First Amendment principles to the Internet. 
Amici write to assist the Court by providing important context for the 
constitutional analysis of S.B. 7072. S.B. 7072 implicates multiple doctrinal areas, 
both constitutional and statutory, and its First Amendment deficiencies are obvious. 
Amici specifically write to highlight how S.B. 7072 impermissibly regulates social 
media platforms’ editorial discretion — long treated as First Amendment protected 
speech by the Supreme Court. S.B. 7072 cannot pass constitutional scrutiny because, 
amongst other failings, it constitutes state management of private entities’ content 
policies, a type of editorial discretion that social media companies enjoy. The district 
court thus properly enjoined the law’s enforcement, and this court should affirm the 
district court’s ruling. 
SUMMARY 
 In 2021, Florida enacted S.B. 7072, a law regulating large social media 
companies and their content policies. Among other provisions, S.B. 7072 prevents 
social media companies from removing political candidates from their services; 




prohibits regulated social media companies’ use of “post-prioritization or shadow 
banning algorithms”; prohibits “censorship” of “journalistic enterprises” by social 
media companies; and creates an exception for social media companies operated by 
companies that own theme parks within the state. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041. 
S.B. 7072 presents a panoply of constitutional and statutory issues; two trade 
associations filed a pre-enforcement challenge to the law, successfully obtaining a 
preliminary injunction. Florida now appeals, arguing that the law satisfies 
constitutional scrutiny and is not preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 230, which immunizes 
interactive community services from almost all liability and preempts contrary state 
law. For a number of reasons explained by appellees and other amici, Florida’s 
claims must fail.  
Specifically, Amici First Amendment Law Professors argue that S.B. 7072 
unconstitutionally infringes social media platforms’ editorial discretion. S.B. 7072 
does not present a difficult or novel question: it infringes on core editorial discretion 
rights, and thus core speech rights. S.B. 7072 crudely mandates content choices by 
private entities: a classic First Amendment violation that cannot satisfy strict 
scrutiny, and would be unlikely to satisfy even less stringent First Amendment 
review. 
Amici contend that Florida’s justifications for S.B. 7072 fail to comport with 
long-settled First Amendment doctrine. Though the state has attempted to reconcile 




S.B. 7072 with the Supreme Court’s precedents, its theory flies in the face of clearly 
established doctrinal principles. Whatever Florida’s policy goals were in enacting 
S.B. 7072, the law’s constitutional infirmities are blatant and irreparable. S.B. 7072, 
facially deficient as it is, cannot satisfy constitutional scrutiny. Thus, this court 
should uphold the district court’s injunction.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The First Amendment Protects Editorial Discretion, Which S.B. 7072 
Impermissibly Regulates. 
A. Social Media Platforms Have First Amendment Protection for 
Content Policy Decisions, Which Requires a Strict Scrutiny Analysis. 
 S.B. 7072 constitutes an extreme and unconstitutional effort by Florida to 
regulate the speech practices of a private entity — precisely the type of governmental 
action the First Amendment disfavors, as it amounts to state management of private 
platforms’ editorial discretion. Such management unconstitutionally regulates 
platform speech. 
 For nearly fifty years, courts have held that private entities such as newspapers 
have First Amendment rights in their choices regarding what content to publish, 
often referred to as editorial discretion. In overturning a Florida “right of reply” 
statute governing newspapers, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Miami Herald v. 
Tornillo: 




The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made 
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of 
public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute 
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be 
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can 
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free 
press as they have evolved to this time.  
 
Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). Lower courts have ratified 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tornillo, including as applied to newspaper 
advertising. See, e.g., Washington Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 518 (4th Cir. 
2019) (“Maryland’s law ‘intru[des] into the function of editors’ and forces news 
publishers to speak in a way they would not otherwise… the First Amendment 
applies in full force to all ‘news, comment, and advertising.’”) (internal citations 
omitted); Memphis Pub. Co. v. Leech, 539 F.Supp. 405, 411 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (“[A 
Tennessee statute] therefore violates the First Amendment by intruding 
impermissibly into the editorial discretion involved in accepting and preparing the 
copy for commercial advertising.”). 
  Tornillo’s holding extends to Internet companies. The Supreme Court held in 
Reno v. ACLU that the historical and technical justifications for radio and broadcast 
regulation do not apply to the Internet. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 
844, 869 (1997) (“[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”). Subsequent cases 
expanded the strict scrutiny analysis to the analogous context of content-based 




Internet regulations; since 2004 courts have required that the government 
demonstrate that it has a compelling interest, that the regulation is narrowly tailored, 
and that it is the least restrictive means of regulating content. See, e.g. Ashcroft v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 665–66 (2004). 
 Because S.B. 7072 regulates content in the form of social media platforms’ 
editorial discretion, and because social media platforms are not subject to a more 
deferential standard of review than other media, it must satisfy strict scrutiny as a 
content-based restriction. As appellee observes, it cannot. Brief of Appellee at 31–
46, NetChoice v. Moody, No. 21-12355 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2021).  
B. S.B. 7072 Impermissibly Interferes with Editorial Discretion 
 Amici emphasize how S.B. 7072, in its regulations of platform content 
policies, impermissibly regulates editorial discretion. The district court properly 
analyzed existing Supreme Court cases that appellant and appellee proffered by 
holding that S.B. 7072 burdened social media platforms’ speech, though it 
improperly emphasized an “invisible-to-the-provider” argument irrelevant to the 
analysis. 
 As the district court correctly observed, multiple Supreme Court cases — 
Tornillo, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 
and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston — 
demonstrate why the government cannot seek to “balance the discussion” on private 




social media platforms. These three cases emphasize that the government cannot 
create mandates regulating private entities engaging in First Amendment-covered 
editorial discretion. Tornillo, as discussed supra, concerned a Florida statute that 
interfered with the editorial choices of newspapers. PG&E and Hurley show that the 
principles of editorial discretion extend to “less-traditional” media or settings such 
as envelopes and parades. While social media companies are most properly 
compared to newspapers, PG&E and Hurley demonstrate how editorial discretion 
rights apply in a variety of settings. 
In PG&E, the Supreme Court held that a mandated right of access to “extra 
space” within a privately-owned utility company’s billing envelopes violated the 
First Amendment rights of the company to choose what messages it disseminated. 
In his controlling plurality opinion, Justice Powell noted “Compelled access like that 
ordered in this case both penalizes the expression of particular points of view and 
forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set.” Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ca., 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986). Importantly, 
Pacific Gas & Electric noted that the Tornillo rule applied to situations that did not 
involve the “institutional press.” Id. at 11 (“The concerns that caused us to invalidate 
the compelled access rule in Tornillo apply to appellant as well as to the institutional 
press.”). Put simply, because the regulation required PG&E to “associate with 




speech with which [it] may disagree,” it was impermissible and triggered strict 
scrutiny. Id. at 15.  
Hurley addressed a type of editorial discretion in a venue even further afield 
from the regulation of newspapers in Tornillo: a regulation requiring that parade 
organizers include a group they disagreed with in their parade. The Supreme Court 
noted that the parade operator “had no written criteria” for inclusion and “did not 
generally inquire into the specific messages or views” of participants. Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 562 (1995). 
Despite this comparatively minor editorial effort, the Court recognized a protected 
speech right in the operator’s choices about which messages to include or exclude. 
The parade’s heterogeneity and general (though not absolute) openness to marchers 
was irrelevant: “[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply 
by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an 
exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.” Id. at 569–70.  
Moreover, the fact that participants in a parade have distinct messages from 
the parade itself is of no consequence to the First Amendment protections afforded 
to the parade organizers’ choice to exclude. Id. at 570 (“Nor, under our precedent, 
does First Amendment protection require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, 
each item featured in the communication.”). Explaining this point, the Hurley court 
drew a direct comparison to Tornillo and newspaper editorial pages, which often run 




editorials from contributors and receive protection for their editorial discretion. Id. 
(“[T]he presentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons 
is a staple of most newspapers' opinion pages, which, of course, fall squarely within 
the core of First Amendment security.... The selection of contingents to make a 
parade is entitled to similar protection.”) (internal citations omitted). 
Taken together, Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley set forth some underlying 
principles governing First Amendment protection of editorial discretion. First, 
private entities — including non-traditional modes of media — that choose to 
exclude other voices retain First Amendment protection. The state cannot force 
private entities to carry or host content contrary to their desired message. Second, 
the private entity need not create the content it hosts to receive First Amendment 
protection, and the content it hosts can be multifaceted, diverse, and potentially even 
contrary to the stated preferences of the entity (as when a newspaper prints a letter 
to the editor criticizing the paper’s editorial perspective). Third, a regulation that 
requires a private entity to carry unwanted commentary cannot survive merely 
because the private entity can “respond” to that which it would otherwise decline to 
publish. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 16 (“[F]orced response is antithetical 
to the free discussion that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”) 
S.B. 7072 flatly violates all these principles. It requires social media platforms 
to host users it disagrees with; manages the methods by which a platform can display 




and rank content; and prevents platforms from labeling user speech that it disagrees 
with. Effectively, Florida has taken its unconstitutional Tornillo statute and added 
even more blatantly unconstitutional provisions. Since Reno, the Supreme Court has 
analogized First Amendment regulation of the Internet to regulation of newspapers, 
and that analogy remains the most apt comparison in this case. In its unbridled, 
excessive interference with private parties’ editorial discretion, S.B. 7072 violates 
First Amendment freedoms; the district court thus properly enjoined the law’s 
enforcement. 
C. The District Court’s “Invisible to the Provider” Analysis Is Irrelevant 
 Though the district court correctly determined that social media platforms’ 
editorial discretion receives First Amendment protection and that S.B. 7072 
unconstitutionally interferes with such discretion, it incorrectly employed an 
“invisible to the provider” standard in its analysis. Amici urge this court to disregard 
that component of the district court’s analysis, as it introduced unnecessary and 
irrelevant complexity into a straightforward question: whether social media 
platforms exercise constitutionally protected editorial discretion. Editorial 
operations can take a variety of forms across different types of media, and the 
constitutional protections for editorial discretion apply regardless of 
implementation. 




 The district court observed that this case presents issues distinct from Tornillo, 
PG&E, and Hurley because social media companies present content that may be 
“invisible to the provider.” Despite this, the district court still determined that S.B. 
7072 regulates speech, not conduct, and was thus subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny. NetChoice v. Moody, No. 21-cv-220-MAF, 2021 WL 2690876, *7–9 (N.D. 
Fla. June 30, 2021). The district court then properly applied strict scrutiny to S.B. 
7072 as a content-based restriction, finding that it failed that test. 
Because the “invisible to the provider” construction proved immaterial to the 
district court’s strict scrutiny analysis, and because of its lack of connection to 
existing doctrine, this court need not employ that element in upholding the district 
court’s ruling that S.B. 7072 regulates content by regulating editorial discretion. 
None of the relevant cases (Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley) reference such a factor. 
Indeed, the record in Hurley suggested that the messages espoused by potential 
parade participants were similarly obscure to the operator.  Whether the private party 
exercising editorial control saw all the content it published or approved was 
irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s analysis in each of the cases. The Supreme Court 
has never equated editorial review with editorial discretion in finding the latter 
protected by the First Amendment. Similarly, no court has held that a content 
provider must preclear third-party content to establish First Amendment protection 
for its editorial discretion. Even if such preclearance or “visibility” were necessary, 




it could be circumvented (as in a parade). The visibility or certainty of what a hosted 
speaker says, or will say, is thus irrelevant in determining whether a platform 
exercises editorial discretion rights. 
 Whether the district court meant to imply that an “invisible to the provider” 
analysis was relevant to finding that social media platforms’ editorial discretion was 
protected speech, such an analysis creates an irrelevant variable inconsistent with 
existing caselaw. As the “invisible to the provider” frame finds no antecedent in First 
Amendment doctrine, and unnecessarily complicates the legal analysis, this court 
should disregard it in finding that social media platforms’ editorial discretion 
receives First Amendment protection. 
II. The State’s Construction of First Amendment Doctrine Ignores Key 
Doctrinal Tenets 
A. Florida Misconstrues Relevant Case Law on Editorial Discretion  
 At the district court and now in this court, Florida constantly insists that S.B. 
7072 regulates conduct, not speech, and that Supreme Court precedent justifies its 
choices to regulate social media providers. The district court correctly rejected these 
arguments, though Florida continues to proffer them in this appeal. Florida’s view 
of the editorial discretion rights of social media platforms is unnecessarily cramped, 
and the state misconstrues all relevant Supreme Court cases in its quest to save S.B. 
7072.  




 Florida unjustifiably limits the nature of editorial discretion rights in order to 
squeeze S.B. 7072 into constitutionality. In its appeal, Florida claims that S.B. 
7072’s mandates do not interfere with editorial discretion because the principles 
underlying Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley do not apply to social media platforms. 
Opening Brief of Appellant at 20–34, NetChoice v. Moody, No. 21-12355 (11th Cir. 
Sept. 7, 2021). Florida reasons that S.B. 7072 complies with the First Amendment 
because platforms can still speak in opposition to “must-carry” speech; their users 
are unlikely to be confused by the speech S.B. 7072 forces platforms to carry; and 
the platforms fail to offer a “unified” speech product. Id. at 24–33. Regardless of the 
accuracy of these arguments, they are irrelevant for the purposes of considering 
editorial discretion. 
 Florida misconstrues Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley by selectively interpreting 
those cases to assert that a platform that fails to promulgate a “unified speech 
product,” has unlimited space to rebut mandated speech, and can avoid consumer 
confusion can be regulated as the state as attempted to do here. In attempting to 
establish the “unified speech product” claim, Florida cites Hurley to argue that a 
social media company, as it only consists of “individual, unrelated segments that 
happen to be transmitted together,” does not receive the same type of treatment as 
Hurley. Id. at 30. By quoting language from Hurley referencing Turner Broadcasting 




System v. FCC, Florida implicitly argues that S.B. 7072 should be compared to the 
cable television regulations upheld by the Court in Turner. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576.  
There are multiple failures with this argument. First, the regulations in Turner 
were held to be content-neutral (warranting intermediate scrutiny); while S.B. 7072, 
despite Florida’s protestations, is clearly content-based. As the district court 
correctly described, S.B. 7072 is “about as content-based as it gets.” NetChoice at 
*10. Turner applied intermediate scrutiny, a more deferential analysis than what the 
court must apply in this case. 
Second, nothing in the Turner plurality opinion suggests that cable operators’ 
editorial speech interests were diminished because cable carries individual, unrelated 
segments. The referenced discussion in Turner concerned the degree to which the 
content-neutral regulations in that case would force cable operators to “alter their 
own messages” — a change that clearly is contemplated by S.B. 7072’s content-
based provisions. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655–56 (1994). 
Lastly, social media platforms’ editorial discretion cannot be properly 
described as “individual, unrelated segments that happen to be transmitted together.” 
Social media platforms develop extensive content moderation policies and 
guidelines to govern what types of content they allow and disallow, with wide 
variations in those policies. It is precisely these policies which Florida seeks to 
override. The platforms make choices about what content to publish and present to 




their users based on the specific audience they hope to reach, and those audiences 
vary widely just as there are differences among newspapers and periodicals. 
Facebook, for example, has much stricter provisions surrounding nudity than 
Twitter, just as The Nation chooses different content than the Wall Street Journal.  
Platforms use content moderation policies to shape what kinds of content they 
host on their platform in much the same way as a newspaper chooses freelance 
pieces, letters to the editor, and advertisements. And merely because the content on 
social media companies might contradict the company’s own speech preferences, or 
other user-generated content, does not mean that the company itself lacks protection; 
as the court noted in Hurley, “a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional 
protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes 
to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech. Hurley at 
569–570. Hurley itself thus undercuts the “unified speech product” argument by 
acknowledging the diversity of views within a setting that retains editorial discretion. 
Florida’s contention that the statutes in Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley only 
apply in situations in which the private entity lacks infinite space to host content and 
distance itself from the mandated content that they disagree with also lacks merit. 
Indeed, the state’s argument is difficult to reconcile with Turner, which expressly 
declined to apply any scarcity-based rationale, noting that there soon may be “no 
practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the cable medium.” 




Turner at 638. Under Florida’s logic, the state could enact a statute identical to the 
one at issue in Tornillo but only have it apply to the Miami Herald’s website, rather 
than its physical edition. Because MiamiHerald.com theoretically could host 
unlimited content, there would be no issue under this theory in mandating that the 
Herald’s website carry editorial content it disagreed with. Of course, such a result 
would be patently absurd and contravene Tornillo. Even social media providers have 
some physical limitations in the content they can host; they cannot extend infinitely 
onto the horizon and incur significant operational costs. 
Finally, Florida argues that because users of social media platforms are 
unlikely to confuse the speech S.B. 7072 mandates platforms carry, interference with 
the platforms’ speech rights is constitutional. In making this assertion, Florida cites 
to PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins and Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights which, as discussed infra Part II.B, are inapposite to this case. 
Florida can find no grounding for this assertion in Tornillo, PG&E, or Hurley; those 
cases do not reference potential confusion as relevant to the contours of protected 
editorial discretion. 
S.B. 7072 also limits the ability for platforms to actually label speech that it 
disagrees with; the statute limits a platform’s ability to “censor” user content, which 
includes “posting an addendum to any content or material posted by a user.” 
§501.2041(b); see §501.2041(2)(a),(b),(d), (j). If a platform cannot necessarily post 




addenda to user speech it disagrees with under the statute, its ability to prevent 
consumer confusion is a dead letter. Florida’s insistence that platforms can reduce 
the possibility that a user might conflate mandated content with its own preferences 
thus rings hollow. 
B. FAIR and PruneYard are Inapposite 
 Florida relies upon two cases — PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins and 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights — to prop up its claims 
that S.B. 7072 appropriately regulates private entities. These cases, one concerning 
a shopping mall and the other concerning law schools, are easily distinguishable 
from the current case and bear no relevance in analyzing the constitutionality of S.B. 
7072.  
 PruneYard upheld the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
California Constitution’s free speech clause as allowing for an affirmative right for 
speakers to enter a private shopping mall to distribute political materials (despite the 
shopping mall’s opposition) as not conflicting with the First Amendment. The 
Supreme Court held that because Tornillo addressed a statute that was an “intrusion 
into the function of editors” — a factor not present in PruneYard, in which the mall 
could hardly be said to have any kind of editorial perspective — it did not apply. 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (internal citations 
omitted). The PruneYard analysis is irrelevant in this case because, as discussed 




supra, platforms do have an editorial perspective in their content moderation policies 
and in the enforcement of such policies. No one would establish a shopping mall for 
the purposes of hosting speakers, just as no one would establish a social media 
platform without considering what type of content to host.  
Florida’s reliance on other statements from PruneYard — that the mall was 
free to dissociate itself from the activists, that no speech was compelled by the mall, 
and that the activists’ message was unlikely to confuse mall customers — are 
irrelevant. Social media platforms (unlike the PruneYard mall) do have an editorial 
perspective. Moreover, as discussed supra, S.B. 7072 interferes with private entities’ 
ability to speak and to label mandated content, and social media platforms could not 
speak out against the mandated speech under the law. 
Florida’s reliance on Rumsfeld v. FAIR is also misguided, because the law 
challenged there — the Solomon Amendment, which required law schools to host 
military employers to receive federal funding — governed entities that lacked 
editorial discretion. Law schools’ speech rights in hosting employers are quite 
different from social media platforms which, again, primarily exist to make choices 
about what types of content to host. Whatever editorial discretion rights a law school 
may have, they do not attach to the presence of potential employers for their students. 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006) 
(“[A]ccommodating the military's message does not affect the law schools' speech, 




because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting 
receptions…. A law school's recruiting services lack the expressive quality of a 
parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a newspaper”). In FAIR, the Court held 
that what distinguished that case from Tornillo, PG&E, and Hurley was that in those 
cases “the complaining speaker's own message was affected by the speech it was 
forced to accommodate.” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 63. That was not true for the 
institutions in FAIR, but is true in this case for the foregoing reasons.  
Florida has tried valiantly to equate social media platforms with malls and law 
schools, but the most obvious comparison has always been to newspapers and thus 
to Tornillo and its progeny. As the Supreme Court observed in Reno v. ACLU, the 
Internet is much more readily compared to historical media like newspapers and 
pamphlets. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (“This dynamic, multifaceted category of 
communication includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, 
video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.”). This court 
should follow that precedent in finding that Tornillo controls in defining the nature 
of social media platforms’ editorial discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
 Nearly fifty years after Tornillo, Florida has once again attempted to defend a 
statute that interferes with the speech rights of private parties. As in that historic 
case, the statute at issue here is so flagrantly unconstitutional as to defeat any of 




Florida’s weak and incorrect explanations. Florida may fear or resent private 
companies’ ability to regulate speech. But it cannot interfere with private entities’ 
First Amendment rights to address whatever social problems it seeks to solve. S.B. 
7072 constitutes an unprecedented and excessive overreach into private entities’ 
editorial discretion rights, and the district court properly enjoined its enforcement to 
protect those rights. This court should thus affirm the judgment of the district court. 
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